When a conservative looks back at the last 30 to 40 years and asks if it was worth it, if they accomplished anything, I think there is one thing that must be acknowledged, at least from my personal perspective. And that is the recovery of the liberal distinction between politics and economics, the discovery of economics, as a distinct field and function. When Reagan spoke about trickle down he should have made clear that he was expanding the old saw that to teach a man to fish is to feed him for life. Charity is temporary, but economic growth means creation of jobs. Granted people may have to move to wherever the jobs are.
This is in contrast to my own youthful suspicion that capitalism is rigged, that the poor are doomed to stay poor, their labor exploited to produce profit for the owner class. Capitalism is the production of wealth. That is not, hopefully, the be all and end all of any society, but it is not bad in itself. With union bargaining power and a sufficient safety net and provision for children (education, nutrition, healthcare) capitalism may be fair enough. A note on unions: there is a logic to the argument that labor should be paid a subsistence wage; when labor is in short supply the wage goes up, and people move in to take advantage of the higher wage and the wage can go down again. What the union does is create a monopoly in labor which can drive up the wage/price. But that increase comes out of capital's profit.
But that is not of course the argument conservatives make. Rather, they hold that I cannot consent to injustice, and surrendering my property is injustice. That you consented to the governmental decision making process is not enough. You can't consent to enslavement (which assumes the government is just another person, not representative and not the agency of law, vs. (someone's) power) (and there is the question of whether democracy understood as the political negation of slavery can lead to enslavement, and if equal protection can allow universal enslavement; I'm still thinking bout this). What I might consent to then is what I would have paid for anyway, ie a private police force (albeit a police force withtou law to enforce). (As evidence that they really do think this way, MY posted about this in re an argument by a conservative blogger with David Brooks comments on anti-tax ideology.) If I say that taking, by government, not for anyone else in particular--kleptocracy--but for whomever might be in need is not stealing; that this articulation would be the flip side of my claim that what you don't need but someone else does is not yours to begin with--this puts my on the far left of American discourse these days, with the more inspired moments of Jefferson.
Americans have a bug up their ass about responsibility, which is why we love addiction. We're afraid of sex so we love porn. Etc. Perhaps this sense of responsibility, ie self creation, is what leads to a technological approach to nature; stewardship is a problematic environmental ethic.
I worry sometimes that my only defense of freedom from want is the harm principle. Sometimes I don't.
Rawls would have us believe that voting is sort of justified after the fact; that if we voted in the spirit that we are (all) allowed to vote, disinterestedly, we would produce laws of justice. We don't actually vote for laws directly, usually, which I think, following Kateb, is a good thing. It eliminates the illusion of direct democracy, of the elision of state and mediation, of the unity of consent and law, of the lack of difference between the individual and society, the lack of tension between self and other, etc.
I want to believe that I can block out all my particulars and remain "human," and know what that is, what it entails, what is due to it. But I fear that the principle of the human just collapses into the harm principle; it has no positive content; there is only the negative principle of do no harm. Bernard Williams's critique of human equality--and what is the definition of the human?--merges into the Hegelian critique of Kant and the diremption. The human is the formal principle of the categorical imperative: make no law unless everyone can agree to it in their (disinterested) humanity: this becomes a circle, and there ends up being no law. Can there be a law of no law? No, that's the point of the diremption critique. That's the there are absolutely no absolutes trap.